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Abstract 
This paper measures the connectedness in European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) sovereign market volatility between April 1999 and January 2014, in order to 
monitor stress transmission and to identify episodes of intensive spillovers from one 
country to the others. To this end, we first perform a static and dynamic analysis to 
measure the total volatility connectedness in the entire period (the system-wide 
approach) using a framework recently proposed by Diebold and Yılmaz (2014). Second, 
we make use of a dynamic analysis to evaluate the net directional connectedness for 
each country and apply panel model techniques to investigate its determinants. Finally, 
to gain further insights, we examine the time-varying behaviour of net pair-wise 
directional connectedness at different stages of the recent sovereign debt crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Regulatory convergence and the elimination of currency risk1 are two of the reasons 
behind the significant increase in cross-border financial activity in the euro area since 
the beginning of the twenty-first century (see Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010 and Barnes et 
al., 2010). This effect has been even stronger in some of the EMU peripheral countries2. 
However, although cross-border banking clearly benefits risk diversification in 
businesses’ portfolios and is considered by monetary authorities as a hallmark of 
successful financial integration, it also presents some drawbacks. First, foreign capital is 
likely to be much more mobile than domestic capital; in a crisis situation, foreign banks 
may simply decide to “cut and run”. Moreover, in an integrated banking system, 
financial or sovereign crises in a country can quickly spill over into other countries. 
Indeed, given the high degree of interconnectedness in European financial markets, a 
major fear was that the default of the sovereign/banking sector in one EMU country 
could have spillover effects that might result in subsequent defaults in the euro area as a 
whole (see Schoenmaker and Wagner, 2013)3. 
In this context, an important reason and justification for providing financial support to 
Greece in May 2010 was precisely the “fear” of contagion (see, for instance, 
Constâncio, 2012), not only because there was a sudden loss of confidence among 
investors, who turned their attention to the macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances within 
EMU countries which had largely been ignored until then (see Beirne and Fratzscher, 
2013), but also because several European Union banks had a particularly high exposure 
to Greece (see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013 or Vuillemey and Peltonen, 
2015)4. As a matter of fact, tensions in EMU sovereign bond markets led to an increase 
in the cost of new loans and a contraction in credit which has been particularly strong in 
the countries most affected by the crisis. Neri and Ropele (2013) show that the higher 
                                                          
1 The introduction of the Single Banking License in 1989 through the Second Banking Directive was a decisive step 
towards a unified European financial market, which led to a convergence in financial legislation and regulation across 
member countries. 
2 In particular, the sources of external financing for Portuguese and Greek banks radically shifted on joining the euro; 
traditionally reliant on dollar debt, their banks were subsequently able to raise funds from their counterparts 
elsewhere in the EMU (see Spiegel, 2009a and 2009b). 
3 Theoretical research modelling various aspects of the costs and benefits of cross-border banking (e.g. Dasgupta 
2004; Goldstein and Pauzner 2004; Wagner 2010) concludes that some degree of integration is beneficial but that an 
excessive degree may not be. 
4 The latter authors explore risk transmission in the euro area by examining the inter-linkages between sovereign and 
banking risk in EMU countries caused by the high sovereign bond holdings of European banks. 
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cost of credit and the contraction in lending exerted a negative and significant effect on 
industrial production in both the peripheral and core countries.  
Indeed, from late 2009 onwards, the demand for the German bund grew due to its safe 
haven status, and yield spreads of euro area issues with respect to Germany spiralled 
(see Figure 1). Besides, since May 2010, not only has Greece been rescued three times, 
but Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus also needed bailouts to stay afloat.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
In this scenario, where we have seen how crisis episodes in a given EMU sovereign 
market affect other markets almost instantaneously, some important questions have 
emerged that economists, policymakers, and practitioners need to address urgently5. To 
what extent was the sovereign risk premium increase in the euro area during the 
European sovereign debt crisis due only to deteriorated debt sustainability in member 
countries? Did markets’ degree of connectedness play any significant role in this 
increase?  
The literature includes two groups of theories of contagion which, though not 
necessarily mutually exclusive (see Dungey and Gajurel, 2013), have fostered 
considerable debate. On the one hand, since fundamentals of different countries may be 
interconnected by their cross-border flows of goods, services, and capital, or common 
shocks may adversely affect several economies simultaneously, transmission between 
countries may occur. These effects are known in the literature as “spillovers” (Masson, 
1999), “interdependence” (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), or “fundamentals-based 
contagion” (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). On the other hand, financial crises in one 
country may conceivably trigger crises elsewhere for reasons unexplained by 
macroeconomic fundamentals – perhaps because they lead to shifts in market sentiment, 
change the interpretation given to existing information, or trigger herding behaviour. 
This transmission mechanism is known in the literature as “pure contagion” (Masson, 
1999).  
                                                          
5 In the mid-2000s, capital flows into the euro area were particularly large and the share of foreign holdings of euro 
area securities increased substantially between the introduction of the euro and the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis. In that context, some authors (Carvalho and Fidora, 2015, among them) show that the increase in foreign 
holdings of euro area bonds in that period is highly associated with a reduction of euro area long-term interest rates. 
Conversely, in crisis times, the important decrease in foreign holdings of sovereign debt triggered a sudden rise of 
their yields. This is the reason why the analysis in this paper is focused in long-term sovereign bond yields, although 
short-term capital is usually more volatile than the long one.     
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In the European context, recent events have encouraged a new discussion of contagion. 
Unlike previous crises, in which the country responsible for spreading the shock was 
relatively clear, in the euro sovereign debt crisis several peripheral countries entered a 
fiscal crisis at roughly the same time. Actually, when a group of countries share an 
exchange rate agreement (a common currency in the case of the EMU countries), crises 
tend to be clustered. Thus, it seems reasonable that, since the economic fundamentals of 
euro area countries are interconnected by their cross-border flows of goods, services, 
and capital, other variables beyond deteriorated debt sustainability might also be at the 
origin of financial stress transmission. 
Researchers have already studied transmission and/or contagion between sovereigns in 
the euro area context using a variety of methodologies (correlation-based measures, 
conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR), or Granger-causality approach, among others)6: 
Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012), Metiu (2012), Caporin et al. (2013), Beirne and 
Fratzscher (2013), Gorea and Radev (2014), Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) or 
Ludwig (2014) to name a few.  
Nevertheless, in this paper we will focus on the interconnection between EMU 
sovereign debt markets by applying a methodology which has not been widely used in 
this area. Specifically, we will make use of Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2014) measures of 
connectedness (both system-wide and pair-wise) in order to contribute to the literature 
on international transmission mechanisms that the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area 
has rekindled, and to be able to answer some of the previously posed questions7. 
Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2014) connectedness framework is closely linked with both 
modern network theory (see Glover and Richards-Shubik, 2014) and modern measures 
of systemic risk (see Ang and Longstaff, 2013 or Acemoglu et al., 2015) and has been 
used by Diebold and Yilmaz (2015) for defining, measuring, and monitoring 
connectedness in financial and related macroeconomic environments (cross-firm, cross-
asset, cross-market, cross-country, etc.). The degree of connectedness, on the other 
hand, measures the contribution of individual units to systemic network events, in a 
                                                          
6 See Biblio et al. (2012) for a review of the measures proposed in the literature to estimate those linkages.  
7 The connectedness methodology has several advantages over the alternative approach of focusing on 
contemporaneous correlations (corrected or not for volatility). First, while correlation is a symmetrical measure, 
connectedness is an asymmetrical one, so the procedure provides information on the direction and magnitude of the 
volatility transmission (from country A to country B, from country B to country A, or both). Second, by investigating 
dynamic connectedness through a rolling window, we can evaluate how the strength of the connectedness evolves 
over time, allowing us to detect episodes of sudden and temporary increases in volatility transmission. 
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fashion very similar to the CoVaR of this unit (see, e. g., Adrian and Brunnermeier, 
2008). 
Although a substantial amount of literature has used different extensions of Diebold and 
Yilmaz’s (2012) previous methodology to examine spillovers and transmission effects 
in stock, foreign exchange, or oil markets in non-EMU countries8, it has been scarcely 
applied to explore crisis transmission in the euro area. Some exceptions are Antonakakis 
and Vergos (2013), who examined spillovers between 10 euro area government yield 
spreads during the period 2007-2012; Claeys and Vašicek (2014), who examined 
linkages between 16 European sovereign bond spreads during the period 2000-2012; 
Glover and Richards-Shubik (2014), who applied a model based on the literature on 
contagion in financial networks to data on sovereign credit default swap spreads (CDS) 
among 13 European sovereigns from 2005 to 2011; and Alter and Beyer (2014), who 
quantify spillovers between sovereign credit markets and banks in the euro area. While 
the above authors apply Diebold and Yilmaz’s methodology, Favero (2013) proposes an 
extension to Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) models to capture time-varying 
interdependence between EMU sovereign yield spreads.  
Therefore, to our knowledge, not only very few papers to date have looked at the 
connectedness and spillover effects within euro area sovereign debt markets (in spite of 
its importance in order to assess whether the benefits of a sovereign bailout may 
outweigh its costs) but, no empirical analyses have been performed of the 
connectedness in sovereigns’ market volatility, despite its profound importance.  
In this context, the first contribution of this paper is to provide a methodological 
contribution and relevant empirical insights into the assessment of financial stress 
transmission in EMU sovereign bond market volatility. In our opinion, as volatility 
reflects the extent to which the market evaluates and assimilates the arrival of new 
information, the analysis of its pattern of transmission may provide insights into the 
characteristics and dynamics of sovereign debt markets. This information might help to 
obtain a better understanding of yield development over time, providing a barometer for 
the vulnerability of these markets. Secondly, the use of the connectedness’ measures 
                                                          
8 Awartania et al. (2013), Lee and Chang (2013), Chau and Deesomsak (2014) and Cronin (2014) apply this 
methodology to examine spillovers in the United States’ markets; Yilmaz (2010), Zhou et al. (2012) or Narayan et al. 
(2014) focus on Asian countries; Apostolakisa and Papadopoulos (2014) and Tsai (2014) examine G-7 economies, 
and Duncan and Kabundi (2013) centre their analysis on South African markets.  
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proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) will allow us to sidestep the contentious issues 
associated with the definition and existence of episodes of “fundamentals-based” or 
“pure” contagion. Indeed, Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2014) methodology can be considered 
as a bridge between the two visions mentioned above since uncertainty is based on how 
much of the forecasting error variance cannot be explained by shocks in the variable and 
volatility spillovers are examined using useful information on agents’ expectations 
(which gauge the evolution of both fundamental and market sentiment variables). 
Thirdly, as volatility tracks investors’ perceived risk and is a crisis-sensitive variable 
which can induce “volatility surprise” (see Engle, 1993), by measuring and analysing 
the dynamic connectedness in volatility we will be able to examine the “fear of 
connectedness” expressed by market participants as they trade.   
To sum up, in this paper we explore a new challenging avenue of research, focusing our 
study on the analysis of connectedness in EMU sovereign debt market volatility using 
Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2014) methodology in order to fill the existing gap in the 
literature. In particular, we will focus on connectedness in EMU sovereign bond market 
volatility during the period from April 1999 to January 2014 and, unlike previous 
studies, in the analysis we will only include euro area countries and work with 10-year 
yields instead of spreads over the German bund, in order to be able to include Germany 
in the study.  
Overall, our results suggest that the positive influence exerted by economically sound 
core countries over peripheral ones in the stability period suddenly vanished with the 
outbreak of the crisis, when investors disavowed the shelter that peripheral countries  
could find in central countries and turned their attention to the major imbalances that 
they presented. Consequently, during the period of stability, beside the slight 
differences in yield behaviour (all followed the evolution of the German bund, and 
spreads moved in a very narrow range) it was the central countries that triggered net 
connectedness relationships; in the crisis period, however, there was a major shift and 
this role was now played by peripheral countries. Therefore, according to our results, in 
a context of increased cross-border financial activity in the euro-area, the concern that in 
turbulent times a shock in one country might have spillover effects into others may be 
well founded, and global financial stability may be threatened. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Diebold and Yılmaz’s 
(2014) methodology for assessing connectedness in financial market volatility, and the 
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empirical results (both static and dynamic) obtained for our sample of EMU sovereign 
markets (a system-wide measure of connectedness). In Section 3 we present the 
empirical results regarding the evolution of net directional connectedness in each 
market, and explore its determinants taking into account the broad literature on 
sovereign spreads drivers since the outbreak of the euro area debt crisis. Section 4 
examines the time-varying behaviour of net pair-wise directional connectedness at 
different stages of the current financial crisis. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the 
findings and offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Connectedness analysis  
2.1. Econometric methodology 
The main tool for measuring the amount of connectedness is based on a decomposition 
of the forecast error variance, which we will now briefly describe. 
Given a multivariate empirical time series, the forecast error variance decomposition 
results from the following steps: 
1. Fit a standard vector autoregressive (VAR) model to the series. 
2. Using series data up to and including time t, establish an H period-ahead forecast (up 
to time t + H). 
3. Decompose the error variance of the forecast for each component with respect to 
shocks from the same or other components at time t. 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) propose several connectedness measures built from pieces 
of variance decompositions in which the forecast error variance of variable i is 
decomposed into parts attributed to the various variables in the system. This section 
provides a summary of their connectedness index methodology. 
Let us denote by dHij the ij-th H-step variance decomposition component (i.e., the 
fraction of variable i’s H-step forecast error variance due to shocks in variable j). The 
connectedness measures are based on the “non-own”, or “cross”, variance 
decompositions, dHij, i, j = 1, . . . , N, i ≠ j.  
Consider an N-dimensional covariance-stationary data-generating process (DGP) with 
orthogonal shocks: ,)( tt uLx   ...,)(
2
210  LLL .),( IuuE tt   Note that 
0 need not be diagonal. All aspects of connectedness are contained in this very general 
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representation. Contemporaneous aspects of connectedness are summarized in 0 and 
dynamic aspects in ,...}.,{ 21  Transformation of ,...},{ 21  via variance 
decompositions is needed to reveal and compactly summarize connectedness. Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2014) propose a connectedness table such as Table 1 to understand the 
various connectedness measures and their relationships. Its main upper-left NxN block, 
which contains the variance decompositions, is called the “variance decomposition 
matrix," and is denoted by ].[ ij
H dD   The connectedness table increases HD  with a 
rightmost column containing row sums, a bottom row containing column sums, and a 
bottom-right element containing the grand average, in all cases for i ≠ j. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The off-diagonal entries of HD are the parts of the N forecast-error variance 
decompositions of relevance from a connectedness perspective. In particular, the gross 
pair-wise directional connectedness from j to i is defined as follows: 
.Hij
H
ji dC   
Since in general ,H ij
H
ji CC    the net pair-wise directional connectedness from j to i, 
can be defined as: 
.H ji
H
ij
H
ij CCC    
As for the off-diagonal row sums in Table 1, they give the share of the H-step forecast-
error variance of variable xi coming from shocks arising in other variables (all others, as 
opposed to a single other), while the off-diagonal column sums provide the share of the 
H-step forecast-error variance of variable xi going to shocks arising in other variables. 
Hence, the off-diagonal row and column sums, labelled “from" and “to" in the 
connectedness table, offer the total directional connectedness measures. In particular, 
total directional connectedness from others to i is defined as 
,
1



 
N
ij
j
H
ij
H
i dC  
and total directional connectedness from j to others  is defined as 
1
.
N
H H
j ji
i
j i
C d


  
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We can also define net total directional connectedness as 
.

 Hi
H
i
H
i CCC  
Finally, the grand total of the off-diagonal entries in DH (equivalently, the sum of the 
“from" column or “to" row) measures total connectedness: 
.
1
1,




N
ij
ji
H
ij
H d
N
C  
For the case of non-orthogonal shocks, the variance decompositions are not as easily 
calculated as before, because the variance of a weighted sum is not an appropriate sum 
of variances; in this case, methodologies for providing orthogonal innovations like 
traditional Cholesky-factor identification may be sensitive to ordering. So, following 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), a generalized VAR decomposition (GVD), invariant to 
ordering, proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) will be used. The 
H-step generalized variance decomposition matrix is defined as 
gH gH
ijD d    , where 
 
 
1
2
1
0
1
0
´
´ ´
H
jj i h j
gH h
ij H
i h h j
h
e e
d
e e






 

 


  
In this case, 
je  is a vector with jth element unity and zeros elsewhere, h  is the 
coefficient matrix in the infinite moving-average representation from VAR,   is the 
covariance matrix of the shock vector in the non-orthogonalized-VAR, 
jj  being its jth 
diagonal element. In this GVD framework, the lack of orthogonality means that the 
rows of gHijd  do not have sum unity and, in order to obtain a generalized connectedness 
index g gijD d    , the following normalization is necessary: 
1
g
ijg
ij N
g
ij
j
d
d
d



, where by 
construction 
1
1
N
g
ij
j
d

  and 
, 1
N
g
ij
i j
d N

   
The matrix g gijD d     permits us to define similar concepts as defined before for the 
orthogonal case, that is, total directional connectedness, net total directional 
connectedness, and total connectedness. 
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2.2. Data 
We use daily data of 10-year bond prices collected from Bloomberg for eleven EMU 
countries: both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Our 
sample begins on 1 April 1999 and ends on 27 January 2014 (i.e., a total of 3,868 
observations)9, spanning several important financial market episodes in addition to the 
crisis of 2007-2008 – in particular, the euro area sovereign debt crisis from 2009 
onwards. Following Parkinson (1980), we estimate the daily variance using daily high 
and low prices10. For market i on day t we have 
2 20.36[ln( ) ln( )] .MAX MINit it itP P      
where 
MAX
itP  it is the maximum (high) price in market I on day t, and 
MIN
itP  is the daily 
minimum (low) price. Given that 
2
it  is an estimator of the daily variance, the 
corresponding estimate of the annualized daily per cent standard deviation (volatility) is 
2 2100 365 .it it   
2.3. Static (full-sample, unconditional) analysis 
The full-sample connectedness table appears as Table 2. As mentioned above, the ijth 
entry of the upper-left 11x11 country submatrix gives the estimated ijth pair-wise 
directional connectedness contribution to the forecast error variance of country i’s 
volatility yields coming from innovations to country j. Hence, the off-diagonal column 
sums (labelled TO) and row sums (labelled FROM) give the total directional 
connectedness to all others from i and from all others to i respectively. The bottom-most 
row (labelled NET) gives the difference in total directional connectedness (to-from). 
Finally, the bottom-right element (in boldface) is total connectedness.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As can be seen, the diagonal elements (own connectedness) are the largest individual 
elements in the table, but total directional connectedness (from others or to others) tends 
to be much larger, except for the EMU peripheral countries. In addition, the spread of 
                                                          
9 The sample starts in April 1999 since data for Greece are only available from that date onwards. 
10 We also used the absolute standardized log-return and the squared returns as alternative measures of daily 
volatility, being the results qualitatively similar. 
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the “from” degree distribution is noticeably greater than that of the “to” degree 
distribution for six out of the eleven cases under study. 
Regarding pair-wise directional connectedness (the off-diagonal elements of the upper-
left 11 × 11 submatrix), the highest observed pair-wise connectedness is from Italy to 
Spain (34.03%). In return, the pair-wise connectedness from Spain to Italy (25.27%) is 
the second-highest. The highest value of pair-wise directional connectedness between 
EMU central countries is from France to Austria (20.03%), followed by that from 
France to the Netherlands (18.85%). The total directional connectedness from others, 
which measures the share of volatility shocks received from other bond yields in the 
total variance of the forecast error for each bond yield, ranges between 7.34% (Greece) 
and 79.95% (Germany). As for the total directional connectedness to others, our results 
suggest that it varies from a low of 13.17% for Portugal to 78.58% for Finland: a range 
of 65.41 points for connectedness to others, lower than the range of 72.61 points found 
for connectedness from others. Finally, we obtain a value of 54.23% for the total 
connectedness between the eleven countries under study for the full sample (system-
wide measure) – significantly lower than the value of 78.3% obtained by Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2014) for US financial institutions, or the 97.2% found by Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012) for international financial markets. 
Given the likelihood of structural breaks during the sample period (see below) we 
provide a separate analysis for connectedness by sub-sampling the data into pre-crisis 
and crisis periods (Tables 3 and 4)11. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here] 
As can be seen, there is a reduction in the values of the diagonal elements presented in 
Table 3 with respect to those reported in Table 2, while the opposite is true in seven out 
of eleven cases when comparing Table 4 with Table 2. This suggests a relative low own 
connectedness before the crisis (being notable for Greece, Italy, Ireland and Spain) and 
a relative high own connectedness during the crisis (especially in the cases of Portugal, 
Ireland and Germany) 12. Furthermore, our results indicate a reduction in both the total 
directional connectedness from others and to others in the crisis period with respect to 
the pre-crisis period, being remarkable in the cases of peripheral countries. Finally, 
                                                          
11 As it is shown in the next sub-Section, the pre-crisis period spans from January 2000 till April 2009, while the 
crisis one goes from April 2009 till the end of the sample (January 2014). 
12 The interested reader is asked to browse through Tables 2 to 4 to find evidence for a particular country. 
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observe that the measure of total connectedness among the volatility of the eleven bond 
yields under study is higher before the crisis (86.35%) than during the crisis (49.97%). 
2.4 Dynamic (rolling, conditional) analysis  
The full-sample connectedness analysis provides a good characterization of 
“unconditional” aspects of the connectedness measures. However, it does not help us to 
understand the connectedness dynamics. The appeal of connectedness methodology lies 
in its use as a measure of how quickly return or volatility shocks spread across countries 
as well as within a country. This section presents an analysis of dynamic connectedness 
which relies on rolling estimation windows13.  
The dynamic connectedness analysis starts with total connectedness, and then moves on 
to net directional connectedness across countries in Section 3. 
2.4.1. Total connectedness 
In Figures 1 to 3 we plot total volatility connectedness over 200-day rolling-sample 
windows and using 10 days as the predictive horizon for the underlying variance 
decomposition. In Figure 1 the rolling total connectedness within the 11 countries in our 
sample is plotted along with the evolution of daily 10-year sovereign yields, while in 
Figures 2 and 3 it is plotted separately and for three groups of countries: all 11 EMU 
countries under study, EMU central countries, and EMU peripheral countries. The 
reason for splitting the sample into these two groups is that, based on a country-by-
country analysis, it can be concluded that EMU countries under study are not 
homogeneous but comprise two categories14. 
In Figure 1, we can identify two distinct periods in the evolution of the total level of 
connectedness, which coincide with the evolution of 10-year yields. In the first period 
(which we will term the “stability period”), the level of connectedness within the 11 
EMU sovereign debt markets in our sample is high, matching the close evolution of 10-
year yields (the spreads moved in a narrow range and reached values close to zero). 
Neither the US subprime crisis of August 2007 nor the Lehman Brothers Collapse of 
September 2008 seemed to have a substantial effect on euro area sovereign debt markets 
and their high level of connectedness. However, when looking at the evolution of the 
                                                          
13 Diebold and Yilmaz (2015) argue that the use of rolling-sample estimation has the advantages of being both 
tremendously simple to implement and coherent with a wide variety of possible data-generating process involving 
time-varying parameters, providing results that are generally intuitive and informative. 
14 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the rolling analysis for these groups of countries. The 
classification of EMU central and peripheral countries follows the standard division presented in the literature. 
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level of connectedness for the different groups of countries (Figure 2) it can be observed 
that, while the above statement is still true for central countries, the degree of 
connectedness within peripheral countries began its downward trend coinciding with the 
Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008. Moreover, Figure 2 also reveals that the crisis 
causes a decrease in the level of connectedness much higher within peripheral than 
within central countries. 
In April 2009, coinciding with a statement by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
expressing its fears of a slowdown in financial market integration, and only some 
months before Papandreou’s government announced Greece’s distressed debt position 
(November 2009)15, sovereign yields begin to spiral and total connectedness, not only 
within the 11 countries in the sample, but also within central countries began a 
downturn trend. From then on, in parallel with the increase in sovereign yields, 
connectedness decreased and entered a different regime.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Moreover, the existence of two different regimes in the evolution of connectedness16 
and the abrupt decrease in the mean in the second regime may explain the low value 
(54.23%) obtained for the total connectedness (system-wide measure) between the 
eleven countries studied over the full period. Indeed, during the pre-crisis period (Table 
3) the total value of connectedness is 86.35 while it takes a value of 49.47 during the 
crisis period (Table 4). Therefore, since the second regime coincides with the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis, we will focus our analysis on this period (denoted as the crisis 
period and spanning from April 2009 to January 2014) which has been split into five 
sub-periods.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
The first sub-period (a), which spans from June 2009 until April 23, 2010 (when Greece 
requested financial support), can still be defined as a pre-crisis period, since the 
downtrend in the total level of connectedness in euro area sovereign debt markets is 
suddenly reversed when it is analysed within all countries and central countries. 
                                                          
15 In November 2009, Papandreou’s government disclosed that its financial situation was far worse than it had 
previously announced, with a yearly deficit of 12.7% of GDP – four times more than the euro area’s limit, and more 
than double the previously published figure – and a public debt of $410 billion. We should recall that this 
announcement only served to worsen the severe crisis in the Greek economy; the country’s debt rating was lowered 
to BBB+ (the lowest in the euro zone) on 8 December. These episodes marked the beginning of the euro area’s 
sovereign debt crisis. 
16 Formal mean and volatility tests (not shown here to save space, but available from the authors upon request) 
strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality in mean and variance before and after 6 April 2009. 
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However, during sub-periods (b) and (c) this downtrend deepens for the three groups of 
countries. Indeed, sub-period (b) – from April 2010 to August 2011 – was a time of real 
turbulence in EMU sovereign debt markets: rescue packages were put in place not only 
in Greece (May 2010), but also in Ireland (November 2010) and Portugal (April 2011), 
and at the end of it (August 2011) the ECB announced its second covered bond 
purchase programme. As noted, the uncertainty continued in European debt markets 
during sub-period (c) (August 2011-July 2012). During this phase (the level of 
connectedness reaches its lowest values for the three groups of countries), Italy was in 
the middle of a political crisis and the main rating agencies lowered the ratings not only 
of peripheral countries but of Austria and France as well. In this context of financial 
distress and huge liquidity problems, the ECB responded forcefully (along with other 
central banks) by implementing nonstandard monetary policies – that is, policies that 
went further than setting the refinancing rate. In particular, the ECB’s principal means 
of intervention were the so-called long term refinancing operations (LTRO) 17. In 
November 2011 and March 2012, the ECB provided banks with a sum close to 500 
billion Euros for a three-year period. However, in March 2012 the second rescue 
package to Greece was approved, and in June 2012 Spain requested financial assistance 
to recapitalize its banking sector. This was the backdrop to the ECB’s President Mario 
Draghi’s statement that he would do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro”. Sub-
period (d), which starts after that statement in July 2012, clearly reflects the healing 
effects of Draghi’s words since a substantial increase in the level of total connectedness 
can be observed in the three groups of EMU sovereign debt markets. Nonetheless, our 
indicator definitely registered a new slowdown (within all countries and peripheral 
ones) in March 2013, when Cyprus requested financial support. Therefore, the last sub-
period (e) spans from that date to the end of the sample (January 2014). 
 
                                                          
17 When the crisis struck, big central banks like the US Federal Reserve slashed their overnight interest-rates in order 
to boost the economy. However, even cutting the rate as far as it could go (to almost zero) failed to spark recovery. 
The Fed then began experimenting with other tools to encourage banks to pump money into the economy. One of 
them was Quantitative Easing (QE). To carry out QE, central banks create money by buying securities, such as 
government bonds, from banks, with electronic cash that did not exist before. The new money swells the size of bank 
reserves in the economy by the quantity of assets purchased—hence “quantitative” easing. In the euro area, the 
principal means of intervention adopted by the ECB was the LTRO, which differed notably from the QE policies of 
the Federal Reserve, in which the Fed purchased assets outright rather than helping to fund banks’ ability to purchase 
them. The LTRO is not the only non-standard monetary policy to have been implemented by the ECB since the crisis. 
Other measures were the narrowing of the corridor, the change in eligibility criteria for collateral, interventions in the 
covered bonds market and, most importantly, the ECB’s launch of the security market programme in 2010 involving 
interventions in the secondary sovereign bond market. The latter programme was discontinued in 2011. 
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3. Net directional connectedness 
The net directional connectedness index provides information about how much each 
country’s sovereign bond yield volatility contributes in net terms to other countries’ 
sovereign bond yield volatilities and, like the full sample dynamic measure presented in 
the previous section, also relies on rolling estimation windows. The time varying-
indicators are displayed in Figures 4a and 4b for central and peripheral EMU countries 
respectively. 
[Insert Figures 4a and 4b here] 
Regarding the whole sample, it is noticeable that in three cases [the Netherlands and 
Finland (see Figure 4a) along with Portugal (see Figure 4b)], more than 50% of the 
computed values are positive, indicating that during most of the sample period, their 
bond yield volatility influenced that of the rest of EMU countries, whereas for the 
remaining countries the opposite is true (i.e., they are net receivers during most of the 
period). Interestingly, for Germany we obtain negative values in 84% of the sample. 
When we split the sample into stability and crisis periods, a different picture emerges. 
Before the crisis, with the exception of Portugal, net triggers were mainly central 
countries, with a percentage of positive values of 85%, 75%, 65%, 61% and 58% for the 
Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Austria and France, respectively (see Figure 4a). 
However, during the crisis period, these countries became net receivers, with negative 
values of 100%, 99%, 98%, 95% and 92% for France, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands 
and Austria respectively. In this second period, Germany also appears as a net receiver 
with a negative value of 100%. Regarding peripheral countries (Figure 4b), four of the 
five countries studied were net receivers during the stability period, with negative 
values of 78%, 57%, 55% and 52% in the cases of Greece, Ireland, Spain and Italy 
respectively; during the crisis period Greece and Portugal became net triggers, with 
positive values of 99% and 52% respectively. 
3.1 Determinants of net directional connectedness 
3.1.1 Econometric methodology 
After evaluating net directional connectedness, similar to Ureche-Rangau and Burietz 
(2013) and Afonso and Nunes (2015), we use panel model techniques to analyse their 
determinants. We should remark that the recent European sovereign debt crisis has 
spurred academics to try to identify the drivers of sovereign risk in the euro area in 
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order to help policy makers to react to similar challenges in the future. So, the analysis 
in this Section draws from this important literature background. 
Indeed, a wide literature re-emerged with the euro debt crisis, reviving and extending, in 
many cases, the already existing literature on this topic in the context of emerging 
markets. The works by Bunda et al. (2009), Özatay et al. (2009), Comelli (2012), Piljak 
(2013), Riedel et al. (2013), Cifarelli and Paladino (2014), Csontó (2014), and Zinna 
(2014) are some examples of the broad literature that analyses sovereign bond spreads 
on emerging economics. Some of the variables included in these authors’ analysis are 
the relative role of global financial conditions and domestic fundamentals [Bunda et al. 
(2009), Banerji et al. (2014), Cifarelli and Paladino (2014), Özatay et al. (2009), and 
Zinna (2014)]; the time-varying nature of spreads determinants in crises periods 
compared to non-crisis times (Comelli, 2012 and Csontó, 2014); or the relevance of 
variables reflecting uncertainty, confidence conditions and perceptions for the upcoming 
economic activity (Piljak, 2013 and Riedel et al., 2013) in explaining sovereign spreads 
behaviour. 
Regarding developed countries, Ureche-Rangau and Burietz (2013) present empirical 
evidence that stress the importance of global financial conditions by showing the 
existence of a statistically significant link between the US subprime crisis and the euro 
debt crisis that might explain why the latter immediately followed the former. Afonso 
and Nunes (2015) focus their analysis on the relevance of perceptions about the 
upcoming economic activity in explaining sovereign spreads behaviour. In particular, 
these authors find that corrections in the European Commission forecasts impinge on 
10-year sovereign bond yields, particularly corrections in fiscal variables, being more 
pronounced in countries with less favourable economic conditions. The time-varying 
nature of spreads determinants in crises periods is explored by Afonso et al. (2015), 
findings that the relationship between euro area sovereign risk and the underlying 
fundamentals is strongly time-varying, turning from inactive to active since the onset of 
the global financial crisis and further intensifying during the sovereign debt crisis. As a 
general rule, they outline that the set of financial and macro spreads’ determinants in the 
euro area is, not only rather unstable, but it also generally becomes richer and stronger 
in significance as the crisis evolves.  
Consequently, in this Section, in order to be able to empirically evaluate the relevance 
of the highest number of variables that have been proposed in the recent theoretical and 
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empirical literature as potential drivers of EMU sovereign bond yields, we will adopt an 
eclectic approach and apply a general-to-specific modelling strategy to capture them. 
Besides, since the potential determinants are available at monthly or quarterly 
frequency, we generate a new dependent variable by computing the monthly average of 
the daily net directional connectedness for each country. 
3.1.2. Instruments for modelling net directional connectedness  
Following the recent literature, we consider two groups of potential determinants of net 
directional connectedness: macroeconomic fundamental variables, and indicators of 
market sentiments. Regarding the macro-fundamentals, we use measures of the 
country’s fiscal position (the government debt-to-GDP and the government deficit-to-
GDP, DEB and DEF hereafter), the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt 
(which is considered a good proxy of liquidity differences among markets, LIQ)18, the 
current-account-balance-to-GDP ratio (CAC) as a proxy of the foreign debt and the net 
position of the country towards the rest of the world, and the Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices monthly inter-annual rate of growth (as a measure of inflation, INF 
and the country’s loss of competitiveness). With respect to market sentiment proxies, 
we use the consumer confidence indicator (CCI) to gauge economic agents’ perceptions 
of future economic activity, and the monthly standard deviation of equity returns (VOL) 
in each country to capture local stock market volatility19. A summary with the definition 
and sources of all the explanatory variables used is presented in Appendix A. 
3.1.3. Empirical results  
Once the net directional connectedness has been calculated based on our empirical 
strategy, and given that the potential determinants have been constructed on a monthly 
frequency, we define a new dependent variable as the monthly average of the daily 
values of the net computed directional connectedness. 
In order to establish the relevant determinants of net directional connectedness, we 
employ a data-based method for obtaining parsimony representation of the data 
                                                          
18 Given the large size differences observed between EMU peripheral sovereign debt markets (see Gómez-Puig and 
Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013), it is likely that the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt (which is considered a 
measure of market depth because larger markets may present lower information costs since their securities are likely 
to trade frequently, and a relative large number of investors may own or may have analysed their features) might be a 
good proxy of liquidity differences between markets. Indeed, some of the literature suggests that market size is an 
important factor in the success of a debt market. Nevertheless, there is another reason to choose this variable: it might 
capture an additional benefit of large markets to the extent that the ‘‘too big to fail theory’’ (TFTF), taken from the 
banking system, might also hold in sovereign debt markets.  
19 We would expect a positive relationship between the variables CAC, LIQ and CCI with net directional 
connectedness; whereas the relationship would be negative for the variables DEB, DEF, INF and VOL. 
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generation process: the general-to-specific approach (Hendry, 1995). General-to-
specific modelling seeks to mimic reduction by commencing from a general congruent 
specification that is simplified to a minimal representation consistent with the desired 
criteria and the data evidence. Starting from a general congruent model that contains all 
the effects likely to be relevant (see Appendix A), standard testing procedures eliminate 
statistically-insignificant variables, with diagnostic tests checking the validity of 
reductions, ensuring a congruent final selection that renders a parsimonious and 
interpretable econometric model that is data admissible, presents well-behaved residuals 
and uses conditioning variables that are weakly exogenous (see Faust and Whiteman, 
1997)20. 
Tables 5 to 7 show the final results for the three groups of countries under study: all 11 
EMU countries in our sample, EMU central countries, and EMU peripheral countries 
throughout the sample period: 2000:01-2014:01. This division makes it possible to 
differentiate the impact of potential determinants on bond spreads in core and peripheral 
countries. We report only the results obtained using the relevant model in each case: the 
Random Effects (RE) model in the case of all EMU countries and peripheral EMU 
countries; and the Fixed Effects (FE) model for the central EMU countries21,22.  
[Insert Tables 5 to 7 here] 
The first column in these tables do not take into account the dynamic properties of net 
directional connectedness; they show the results for the whole period (pre-crisis and 
crisis) in order to select the best model for use in the rest of the analysis after having 
eliminated statistically insignificant variables. However, since we have previously 
detected a potential structural change in April 2009, we analyse the differences in the 
significance of the coefficients over time (i.e., during the stability and the crisis 
periods).  
                                                          
20 Phillips (1988) contends that the general-to-specific methodology performs a set of corrections that make it an 
optimal procedure under weak exogeneity. 
21  We consider three basic panel regression methods: the fixed-effects (FE) method, the random effects (RE) model 
and the pooled-OLS method. In order to determine the empirical relevance of each of the potential methods for our 
panel data, we make use of several statistic tests. In particular, we test FE versus RE using the Hausman test statistic 
to test for non-correlation between the unobserved effect and the regressors. To choose between pooled-OLS and RE, 
we use Breusch-Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test to test for the presence of an unobserved effect. Finally, we use the 
F test for fixed effects to test whether all unobservable individual effects are zero, in order to discriminate between 
pooled-OLS and RE. To save space, we do not show here these tests. They are available from the authors upon 
request. 
22 In the case of the FE model, we make use of Arellano’s (1987) proposal to adjust White standard errors to account 
for the possible correlation within a cluster. Petersen (2008) examines the sensitivity of standard error estimates to the 
presence of a firm fixed effect (in our case, country fixed effects), showing that  OLS, the Fama-MacBeth standard 
errors and the Newey-West standard error are biased and only clustered standard errors are unbiased as they account 
for the residual dependence created by the firm effect.  
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Therefore, in addition to the independent variables chosen a dummy (DCRISIS), which 
takes the value 1 in the crisis period (and 0, otherwise) is also introduced in the 
estimations, and the coefficients of the interactions between this dummy and the rest of 
variables are calculated (see Gómez-Puig, 2006 and 2008). Thus, the impact of each 
independent variable is given by: 
β = β1 + β2DCRISIS 
We honestly think that a formal coefficient test H0: β1 = β1 + β2, to assess whether the 
impact of independent variables on net directional connectedness changed significantly 
with the start of the sovereign debt crisis is unnecessary as long as β2 is significant. So 
the marginal coefficients of a variable are: 
β = β1 (in the stability period) 
β = β1 + β2 (in the crisis period) 
The second column in Tables 5 to 7 shows the re-estimation results with the DCRISIS 
dummy. Looking across the columns in these tables we see that, when examining the 
variables measuring market sentiment in all eleven countries (Table 5) we find a 
negative and significant effect for the stock-market volatility (VOL), whereas, as 
expected, the consumer confidence indicator (CCI) presents a positive sign. As for the 
local macro-fundamentals, our results suggest a negative impact on the net directional 
connectedness of variables measuring the fiscal position (both the debt and the deficit-
to-GDP). Moreover, without exception, all coefficients register an increase in the crisis 
period compared to the pre-crisis one. This rise in the sensitivity to both fundamentals 
and market sentiment during the crisis period compared with the pre-crisis is in line 
with the previous empirical literature (see Gómez-Puig et al., 2014 and Afonso et al., 
2015, among others). 
Our analysis also highlights the differences between the two groups of EMU countries, 
central and peripheral. In net directional connectedness episodes triggered by peripheral 
countries, variables that gauge market participants’ perceptions seem to present a higher 
relevance, while macroeconomic fundamentals seem to play a greater role in 
relationships where central countries are the triggers. In the latter case (see Table 6), 
three variables gauging macroeconomic fundamentals are significant with the expected 
sign (the loss of competitiveness (INF), the Government debt-to-GDP (DEB) and the 
net position towards the rest of the word (CAC)); while in the former (see Table 7) only 
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the variable that captures the government deficit-to-GDP (DEF) turns out to be 
significant. With regard to the variables measuring market sentiment, in the two sub-
samples we find a negative and significant effect for stock-market volatility (VOL), 
whereas, as expected, the consumer confidence indicator (CCI) presents a positive 
sign23. Again, without exception, for the two groups of countries all coefficients register 
an increase during the crisis compared to the pre-crisis period. 
Therefore, our results indicate that the crisis had a significant impact on the markets’ 
reactions to financial news, especially in the peripheral countries. In this respect, some 
authors have argued that the financial crisis might spread from one country to another 
due to market imperfection or the herding behaviour of international investors. A crisis 
in one country may give a “wake-up call” to international investors to reassess the risks 
in other countries; uninformed or less informed investors may find it difficult to extract 
the signal from the falling price and follow the strategies of better informed investors, 
thus generating excess co-movements across the markets. The findings presented by 
Beirne and Fratscher (2013), for instance, also indicate that for some EMU countries 
such as peripheral countries there is strong evidence of this “wake-up call” contagion, 
though for other countries there is much less evidence of this kind since the relevance of 
macroeconomic fundamentals is higher. 
 
4. Net pair-wise directional connectedness  
So far, we have discussed the behaviour of the total connectedness and total net 
directional connectedness measures for eleven EMU sovereign debt markets. However, 
in order to gain further insights, we have also examined their net pair-wise directional 
connectedness.  
[Insert Figures 5a and 5b here] 
Specifically, Figure 5a displays net pair-wise directional connectedness during the two 
detected regimes, while Figure 5b presents the results obtained during the five sub-
periods into which the crisis period has been divided.  
Both figures present very interesting results. Figure 5a shows that while in the stability 
period central countries are the triggers in the connectedness relationships, in the crisis 
regime, these relationships are stronger when the trigger is a peripheral country. These 
                                                          
23 The only variable that does not turn out to be significant in any of the estimations is our proxy for the market 
liquidity. 
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results corroborate those presented in Figure 4 where we plotted net dynamic directional 
connectedness in both core and peripheral countries.  
In particular, in the stability period, connectedness relationships departing from central 
countries accounted for 75% of the total, and in the tenth and twentieth percentile all the 
receiver countries are peripheral (Greece, Ireland and Italy). Conversely, in the crisis 
period, the connectedness relationships account for 59% of the total when peripheral 
countries are the triggers (in the tenth and twentieth percentile, only three relationships 
are detected departing from central countries), and although receivers are mostly 
peripheral, central countries still account for 41% of the total. 
These results are very illuminating since they reinforce the idea that during the first ten 
years of currency union, investors’ risk aversion was very low since they overestimated 
the healing effect that economically sound central countries might have on the rest of 
the Eurozone. However, the situation radically changed with the advent of the crisis; 
suddenly, market participants focused their attention on the substantial macroeconomic 
imbalances that some peripheral countries presented which not only would eventually 
lead them to default, but might also affect central countries that held important shares of 
the sovereign assets of those countries (the results suggest that both peripheral and 
central countries are net receivers of the connectedness relationships that mainly depart 
from peripheral countries). 
Moreover, the main conclusions that can be drawn from Figure 5b, which displays the 
evolution of the net pair-wise directional connectedness during the five crisis sub-
periods, are the following.  
During sub-period (a), the period just before the beginning of the euro-area sovereign 
debt crisis (marked by Papandreou’s disclosure of Greece’s distressed public finances in 
November 2009), we not only detect a significant number (25) of net pair-wise 
relationships, but in 72% of the cases central countries are still the triggers. However, an 
important difference with respect to the pre-crisis period is that peripheral countries 
carry less weight as receivers. In this sub-period, they account for 60% of the total, 
while the rest (40%) are central countries, showing that the effects of the crisis have 
clearly extended to the central countries.  
Nonetheless, the situation radically changes in sub-period (b), which includes the bail-
outs of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. In this phase not only does the number of 
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connectedness relationships decrease from 25 to 14, but their direction changes as well. 
In this second sub-period of the crisis, net pair-wise connectedness relationships mainly 
occur between peripheral countries, which have a weight of around 71% both as triggers 
and as receivers. Besides, it is worth noting that during this phase two central countries 
remain disconnected from the rest: the Netherlands and Finland. During sub-period (c), 
which includes the support to the Spanish banking sector, Figure 3 shows that the total 
level of connectedness still registers a downturn trend; but although the number of 
connectedness relationships remains low (15), the amount detected in the tenth 
percentile clearly increases (up to 80%). Another significant development is the fact that 
central countries recover their role in the relationships as both triggers and receivers 
(67% of the total).  
However, after Mario Draghi’s statement in July 2012 (sub-period d), a clear shift is 
observed. Now, net pair-wise relationships rise to 33 (even more than in sub-period (a)) 
and not only is the role of central countries as triggers stressed (they represent 76% of 
the total), but peripheral countries also recover their role as receivers, returning to the 
level of the pre-crisis period (64%). Finally, in the last sub-period (which begins with 
the rescue of Cyprus), we again observe a decrease in the number of pair-wise 
connectedness relationships; however, the majority of them take place between 
peripheral countries, both as triggers (53% of the total) and as receivers (65%). 
 
5. Concluding remarks. 
The contribution of the empirical analysis presented in this paper to the existing 
literature is twofold.  
First, our results support the hypothesis that peripheral countries imported credibility 
from central countries during the first ten years of EMU. Nevertheless, the outbreak of 
the crisis ushered in a sudden shift in the sentiment of market participants who now paid 
more attention to the significant macroeconomic imbalances in some of the peripheral 
countries and the possibility of contagion to central countries.  
Secondly, they suggest that the sovereign risk premium increase in the euro area during 
the European sovereign debt crisis was not only due to deteriorated debt sustainability 
in member countries, but also to a shift in the origin of connectedness relationships 
which, as the crisis unfolded, mostly departed from peripheral countries. In this context, 
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where cross-border financial activity was very important and market sentiment 
indicators played a key role in explaining connectedness relationships triggered by 
peripheral countries, the risk that the default of the sovereign/banking sector in one of 
these countries might spread to other countries could not be disregarded by financial 
authorities and policymakers with responsibility for ensuring financial stability. 
A natural extension of the analysis presented in this paper would be to explore the 
implications of connectedness in the context of fixed income portfolios, using some 
trading strategies that directly utilize connectedness’ information on risk diversification 
(the higher the degree of connectedness the lower the opportunities to diversify risk). 
This is an item in our future research agenda. 
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Appendix A: Definition of the explanatory variables to model net directional 
connectedness 
 
A.1. Variables that measure local macro-fundamentals. 
Variable Description Source 
Net position  
vis-à-vis 
the rest of the 
world 
(CAC)  
Current-account-balance-to-GDP 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations. 
 
OECD 
Competitiveness 
(INF) 
Inflation rate. HICP monthly inter-annual rate 
of growth 
Eurostat  
 
Fiscal Position 
(DEB and DEF) 
 
Government debt-to-GDP and Government 
deficit-to-GDP. Monthly data are linearly 
interpolated from quarterly observations. 
 
Eurostat  
 
Market liquidity 
(LIQ) 
 
Domestic Debt Securities. Public Sector 
Amounts Outstanding (billions of US dollars) 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations.  
 
BIS Debt securities statistics. 
Table 18  
 
 
 
A.2. Variables that measure local market sentiment. 
Variable Description Source 
 
Stock Volatility 
(VOL) 
Monthly standard deviation of the daily 
returns of each country’s stock market 
general index 
 
Datastream 
 
Consumer 
Confidence 
Indicator 
(CCI) 
  
 
This index is built up by the European 
Commission which conducts regular 
harmonised surveys to consumers in each 
country. 
 
European Commission (DG 
ECFIN) 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors thank Maria del Carmen Ramos-Herrera and Manish K. Singh for excellent 
research assistance. Simón Sosvilla-Rivero thanks the Universitat de Barcelona and 
RFA-IREA for their hospitality. Financial support from Spanish Ministry of Education 
through grant ECO2013-48326 and from Banco de España through a grant from 
Programa de Ayudas a la Investigación 2016–2017 en Macroeconomía, Economía 
Monetaria, Financiera y Bancaria e Historia Económica are gratefully acknowledged. 
Responsibility for any remaining errors rests with the authors. 
 
 25 
References 
Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A., Tahbaz-Salehi, A., 2015. Systemic risk and stability in 
financial networks. American Economic Review 105, 564-608. 
Adrian, T., Brunnermeier, M., 2008.  CoVaR. Staff Report 348, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. 
Afonso, A., Arghyrou, M.G., Bagdatoglou, G, Kontonikas, A. 2015. On the time-
varying relationship between EMU sovereign spreads and their determinants. Economic 
Modelling 44, 363-371. 
Afonso, A., Nunes, A.S. 2015. Economic forecasts and sovereign yields. Economic 
Modelling 44, 319-326. 
Alter, A., Beyer, A., 2014) The dynamics of spillover effects during the European 
sovereign debt turmoil. Journal of Banking and Finance 42, 134-153. 
Ang, A., Longstaff, F. A., 2013. Systemic sovereign credit risk: Lessons from the US 
and Europe. Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 493-510. 
Antonakakis, N., Vergos, K., 2013. Sovereign bond yield spillovers in the Euro zone 
during the financial and debt crisis. Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money 26, 258-272. 
Apostolakisa, G., Papadopoulos, A. P., 2014. Financial stress spillovers in advanced 
economies. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 32, 128-
149. 
Arellano, M. 1987. Computing robust standard errors for within-groups estimators. 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistic 49, 431–433. 
Awartania, B., Maghyerehb, A.I., Al Shiabc, M., 2013. Directional spillovers from the 
U.S. and the Saudi market to equities in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 27, 224-242. 
Banerji, S., Ventouri, A., Wang, Z. 2014. The sovereign spread in Asian emerging 
economies: The significance of external versus internal factors. Economic Modelling 
36, 566-576. 
Barnes, S., Lane, P. R., Radziwill,. A., 2010. Minimising risks from imbalances in 
European banking. Working Paper 828, Economics Department, Organization for 
Economomic Cooperation and Development. 
Beirne, J., Fratzscher, M., 2013. The pricing of sovereign risk and contagion during the 
European sovereign debt crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance 34, 60-82. 
 26 
Billio, M., Getmansky, M. Lo, A.W., Pelizzon, L., 2012. Econometric measures of 
connectedness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors. Journal of 
Financial Economics 104, 535–559. 
Bunda, I., Hamann, A.J., Lall, S. 2009. Correlations in emerging market bonds: The role 
of local and global factors. Emerging Markets Review 10, 67-96. 
Caporin, M., Pelizzon, L., Ravazzolo, F., Rigobon, R., 2013. Measuring sovereign 
contagion in Europe. Working Paper 18741, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Carvalho, D., Fidora, M. 2015. Capital inflows and euro area long-term interest rates. 
European Central Bank Working Paper Series 1798. Frankfurt am Main, Germany. 
Chau, F., Deesomsak, R., 2014. Does linkage fuel the fire? The transmission of 
financial stress across the markets. International Review of Financial Analysis 36, 57-
70. 
Cifarelli, G., Paladino, G. 2014. The impact of the Argentine default on volatility co-
movements in emerging bond markets. Emerging Markets Review 5, 427-446. 
Claeys, P., Vašicek, B., 2014. Measuring bilateral spillover and testing contagion on 
sovereign bond markets in Europe. Journal of Banking and Finance 46, 151-165. 
Comelli, F. 2012. Emerging market sovereign bond spreads: Estimation and back-
testing. Emerging Markets Review 13, 598-625. 
Constâncio, V., 2012. Contagion and the European debt crisis. Financial Stability 
Review 16, 109-119. 
Cronin, D., 2014. The interaction between money and asset markets: A spillover index 
approach. Journal of Macroeconomics 39, 185-202 
Csontó, B. 2014. Emerging market sovereign bond spreads and shifts in global market 
sentiment. Emerging Markets Review 20, 58-74. 
Dasgupta, A., 2004. Financial contagion through capital connections: A model of the 
origin and spread of bank panics. Journal of the European Economic Association 2, 
1049–1084. 
Diebold, F. X., Yilmaz, K., 2012. Better to give than to receive: Predictive directional 
measurement of volatility spillovers. International Journal of Forecasting 28, 57-66. 
Diebold, F. X., Yilmaz, K., 2014.  On the network topology of variance 
decompositions: Measuring the connectedness of financial firms. Journal of 
Econometrics 182, 119–134. 
Diebold, F. X., Yilmaz, K., 2015.  Financial and macroeconomic connectedness: A 
network approach to measurement and monitoring, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
 27 
Duncan, A. S., Kabundi, A., 2013. Domestic and foreign sources of volatility spillover 
to South African asset classes. Economic Modelling 31, 566-573. 
Dungey, M., Gajurel, D., 2013.  Equity market contagion during the global financial 
crisis: Evidence from the World’s eighth largest economies. Working Paper 15, UTAS 
School of Economics and Finance. 
Engle R., 1993. Technical note: Statistical models for financial volatility. Financial 
Analyst Journal 49, 72-78. 
Faust. J., Whiteman, C. H. 1997. General-to-specific procedures for fitting a data-
admissible, theory-inspired, congruent, parsimonious, encompassing, weakly 
exogenous, identified, structural model to the DGP: A translation and critique, 
International Finance Discussion Papers 1997-576, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
Favero, C.A., 2013. Modelling and forecasting government bond spreads in the euro 
area: a GVAR model. Journal of Econometrics 177, 343-356. 
Forbes, K., Rigobon, R., 2002. No contagion, only interdependence: Measuring stock 
market comovements. Journal of Finance 57, 2223-2261. 
Goldstein, I., Pauzner, A., 2004. Contagion of self-fulfilling financial crises due to 
diversification of investment portfolios. Journal of Economic Theory 119, 151–283. 
Gómez-Puig, M., 2006. Size matters for liquidity: Evidence from EMU sovereign yield 
spreads. Economics Letters 90, 156-162. 
Gómez-Puig, M., 2008. Monetary integration and the cost of borrowing. Journal of 
International Money and Finance 27, 455-479. 
Gómez-Puig, M., Sosvilla-Rivero, S., 2013. Granger-causality in peripheral EMU 
public debt markets: A dynamic Approach. Journal of Banking and Finance 37, 4627-
4649. 
Gómez-Puig, M., Sosvilla-Rivero, S., 2014. Causality and contagion in EMU sovereign 
debt markets. International Review of Economics and Finance 33, 12-27. 
Gómez-Puig, M., Sosvilla-Rivero, S., Ramos-Herrera, M.C., 2014. An update on EMU 
sovereign yield spreads drivers in times of crisis: A panel data analysis. North American 
Journal of Economics and Finance 30, 133-153. 
Glover, B., Richards-Shubik, S., 2014. Contagion in the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis. Working Paper No. 20567, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 28 
Gorea, D., Radev, D., 2014. The euro area sovereign debt crisis: Can contagion spread 
from the periphery to the core? International Review of Economics and Finance 30, 78-
100. 
Hendry, D.F., 1995. Dynamic Econometrics. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Kalbaska, A., Gatkowski, M., 2012. Eurozone sovereign contagion: Evidence from the 
CDS market (2005–2010). Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 83, 657-
673. 
Kalemi-Ozcan, S.; Papaioannou, E., Peydró-Alcalde, J. L., 2010. What lies beneath the 
Euro’s effect on financial integration? Currency risk, legal harmonization, or trade? 
Journal of International Economics 81, 75-88. 
Kaminsky, G. L., Reinhart, C. M., 2000. On crises, contagion, and confusion. Journal of 
International Economics 51, 145-168. 
Koop, G., Pesaran, M. H., Potter, S. M., 1996. Impulse response analysis in non-linear 
multivariate models. Journal of Econometrics 74, 119–147. 
Lee, H. C., Chang, S. L., 2013. Finance spillovers of currency carry trade returns, 
market risk sentiment, and U.S. market returns. North American Journal of Economics 
and Finance 26, 197-216. 
Ludwig, A., 2014. A unified approach to investigate pure and wake-up-call contagion: 
Evidence from the Eurozone's first financial crisis. Journal of International Money and 
Finance 48, 125-146. 
Masson, P., 1999. Contagion: Macroeconomic models with multiple equilibria. Journal 
of International Money and Finance 18, 587-602.  
Metieu, N., 2012. Sovereign risk contagion in the eurozone. Economics Letters 117, 35-
38. 
Narayan, P.K. Narayan, S., Prabheesh K.P., 2014. Stock returns, mutual fund flows and 
spillover shocks. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 29, 146-162. 
Neri, S., Ropele, T., 2013. The macroeconomic effects of the sovereign debt crisis in the 
euro area. In: Banca d’Italia (Ed.), The sovereign debt crisis and the euro area (pp. 267-
313), Banca d’Italia: Rome. 
Özatay, F., Özmen, E. Şahinbeyoğlu, G. 2009. Emerging market sovereign spreads, 
global financial conditions and U.S. macroeconomic news. Economic Modelling 26, 
526–531. 
Parkinson, M., 1980. The extreme value method for estimating the variance of the rate 
of return. Journal of Business 53, 61–65. 
 29 
Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y., 1998. Generalized impulse response analysis in linear 
multivariate models. Economics Letters 58, 17–29. 
Petersen, M., 2008. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing 
approaches, Review of Financial Studies 22, 435-480. 
Phillips, P. C. B., 1988. Reflections on econometric methodology. Economic Record 64, 
344–359. 
Piljak. V., 2013. Bond markets co-movement dynamics and macroeconomic factors: 
Evidence from emerging and frontier markets. Emerging Markets Review 17, 29-43. 
Riedel, C., Thuraisamy, K.S., Wagner, N. 2013. Credit cycle dependent spread 
determinants in emerging sovereign debt markets. Emerging Markets Review 17, 209-
223. 
Schoenmaker, D., Wagner, W., 2013. Cross-Border Banking in Europe and Financial 
Stability. International Finance 16, 1–22 
Spiegel, M., 2009a. Monetary and financial integration in the EMU: Push or pull? 
Review of International Economics 17, 751-776. 
Spiegel, M., 2009b. Monetary and financial integration: Evidence from the EMU. 
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 23, 114-130. 
Tsai, I.C.,  2014.  Spillover of fear: Evidence from the stock markets of five developed 
countries. International Review of Financial Analysis 33, 281-288. 
Ureche-Rangau, L., Burietz, A. 2013. One crisis, two crises…the subprime crisis and 
the European sovereign debt problems. Economic Modelling 35, 35-44. 
Vuillemey, G. Peltonen, T.A. 2015. Disentangling the bond–CDS nexus: A stress test 
model of the CDS market. Economic Modelling 49, 32-45. 
Wagner, W., 2010. Diversification at Financial Institutions and Systemic Crises, Journal 
of Financial Intermediation 19, 373–86. 
Yilmaz, K., 2010. Return and volatility spillovers among the East Asian equity markets. 
Journal of Asian Economics 21, 304-313. 
Zhou, X., Zhang, W.,  Zhang, J., 2012. Volatility spillovers between the Chinese and 
world equity markets. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 20, 247-270. 
Zinna, G. 2014. Identifying risks in emerging market sovereign and corporate bond 
spreads. Emerging Markets Review 20, 1-22. 
 
 30 
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Table 2: Full-sample connectedness 
  
GER 
 
FRA 
 
ITA 
 
SPA 
 
NET 
 
BEL 
 
AUS 
 
GRE 
 
FIN 
 
POR 
 
IRE 
 
Contribution From 
Others 
GER 20.05 18.39 2.83 1.34 17.09 9.79 13.04 0.08 17.20 0.07 0.12 79.95 
FRA 10.38 29.44 1.10 0.29 14.93 13.11 15.48 0.41 14.71 0.09 0.07 70.56 
ITA 0.52 0.36 68.00 25.27 0.67 3.08 0.30 0.00 0.76 0.13 0.90 32.00 
SPA 0.22 0.03 34.03 61.69 0.20 1.69 0.08 0.08 0.34 0.38 1.26 38.31 
NET 12.24 18.85 2.74 0.50 20.64 12.72 14.75 0.01 17.38 0.16 0.02 79.36 
BEL 4.89 10.26 12.36 4.91 8.97 41.10 8.48 0.34 8.41 0.10 0.16 58.90 
AUS 9.13 20.03 1.06 0.19 15.11 14.00 23.83 0.55 15.93 0.16 0.01 76.17 
GRE 0.10 0.23 2.89 2.13 0.10 0.12 0.01 92.66 0.03 1.05 0.67 7.34 
FIN 12.09 18.65 3.23 1.04 17.09 11.55 15.74 0.10 20.39 0.09 0.03 79.61 
POR 0.01 0.37 10.13 13.34 0.04 0.04 0.36 10.44 0.04 54.45 10.80 45.55 
IRE 0.07 0.36 8.28 10.23 0.00 1.02 0.12 2.70 0.01 6.04 71.18 28.82 
Contribution 
To Others 
71.23 74.83 53.63 48.99 78.24 62.02 74.15 13.69 78.58 13.17 16.48 Total 
connectedness 
=54.23 
Net Contribution 
(To –From) Others 
 
-8.72 
 
4.27 
 
21.63 
 
10.68 
 
-1.12 
 
3.13 
 
-2.02 
 
6.34 
 
-1.03 
 
-2.37 
 
-2.34 
 
 
 
Note: GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland respectively. 
 31 
Table 3: Full-sample connectedness before the breakpoint 
  
GER 
 
FRA 
 
ITA 
 
SPA 
 
NET 
 
BEL 
 
AUS 
 
GRE 
 
FIN 
 
POR 
 
IRE 
 
Contribution 
From Others 
GER 
14.52 10.13 6.17 9.07 11.74 9.05 10.62 4.00 11.35 8.40 4.95 85.48 
FRA 
10.33 11.04 6.83 9.70 11.43 9.92 10.25 4.54 11.01 9.11 5.85 88.96 
ITA 
6.39 7.16 12.71 10.10 9.00 10.21 8.59 7.66 8.79 10.90 8.48 87.29 
SPA 
7.31 7.83 9.05 12.43 9.85 10.81 9.45 5.93 9.67 10.41 7.26 87.57 
NET 
9.64 9.28 7.04 10.01 12.57 10.33 10.03 4.41 11.03 9.39 6.28 87.43 
BEL 
7.37 8.12 8.65 11.14 10.30 12.24 9.31 5.42 9.91 10.45 7.09 87.76 
AUS 
9.25 8.85 7.51 10.39 10.79 10.20 11.99 4.54 10.89 9.69 5.91 88.01 
GRE 
5.97 6.48 9.12 7.70 7.31 8.12 7.61 19.30 7.81 9.03 11.54 80.70 
FIN 
9.46 9.06 7.00 9.87 11.12 10.12 10.28 4.49 12.94 9.53 6.15 87.06 
POR 
6.95 7.40 9.51 10.43 9.31 10.17 9.14 6.60 9.46 12.89 8.14 87.11 
IRE 
5.79 6.16 8.27 8.27 8.44 9.40 7.49 10.83 8.62 9.22 17.51 82.49 
Contribution 
To Others 
84.38 87.93 86.16 88.61 88.76 88.93 88.56 75.17 88.40 88.18 80.36 
Total 
connectedness 
=86.35 
Net Contribution 
(To –From) Others 
 
-1.10 
 
-1.03 
 
-1.12 
 
1.04 
 
1.33 
 
1.17 
 
0.54 
 
-5.53 
 
1.33 
 
1.07 
 
-2.13 
 
 
Table 4: Full-sample connectedness after the breakpoint 
  
GER 
 
FRA 
 
ITA 
 
SPA 
 
NET 
 
BEL 
 
AUS 
 
GRE 
 
FIN 
 
POR 
 
IRE 
 
Contribution 
From Others 
GER 
31.71 7.81 0.25 0.08 24.55 1.06 9.05 0.36 24.25 0.02 0.86 68.29 
FRA 
11.12 28.40 0.10 0.06 13.39 12.68 21.46 0.11 12.19 0.38 0.14 71.60 
ITA 
0.83 0.99 58.75 28.71 0.08 5.02 1.06 0.26 0.20 2.17 1.92 41.25 
SPA 
1.11 2.13 26.01 60.96 0.31 3.80 2.46 0.17 0.79 0.40 1.87 39.04 
NET 
20.83 9.78 0.21 0.02 29.76 3.01 11.40 0.47 24.04 0.04 0.43 70.24 
BEL 
3.30 15.41 2.83 2.31 4.29 50.75 16.12 0.03 3.71 0.84 0.41 49.25 
AUS 
10.42 19.07 0.01 0.02 12.93 11.71 31.05 0.10 13.91 0.63 0.15 68.95 
GRE 
2.65 0.15 6.23 3.40 1.67 0.63 0.38 79.83 1.12 3.14 0.80 20.17 
FIN 
20.00 9.94 0.12 0.03 22.88 3.86 13.68 0.36 28.83 0.13 0.17 71.17 
POR 
0.66 0.02 8.81 5.67 0.66 0.93 0.19 3.65 1.03 70.26 8.13 29.74 
IRE 
0.05 0.34 1.59 3.44 0.26 2.88 0.62 1.05 0.00 4.25 85.51 14.49 
Contribution 
To Others 
69.11 69.80 44.00 41.78 73.14 47.32 71.11 7.59 73.81 14.58 14.83 
Total 
connectedness 
=49.47 
Net Contribution 
(To –From) Others 
 
0.82 
 
-1.80 
 
2.74 
 
2.74 
 
2.90 
 
-1.93 
 
2.16 
 
-12.6 
 
2.64 
 
-15.2 
 
0.34 
 
 
            
Note: GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland respectively. 
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Table 5. Panel regression: All countries 
 Without dummy With dummy 
Constant 2.5705* 
(3.8189) 
2.8238* 
(3.4237) 
DCRISIS  -0.7563* 
(-4.2693) 
Macrofundamentals 
DEF -0.2132* 
(-3.8710) 
-0.2009* 
(-3.4541) 
DCRISIS*DEF  -0.0056* 
(-3. 2530) 
DEB -0.0146* 
(-6.8134) 
-0.0122* 
(-5.4660) 
DCRISIS*DEB  -0.0041* 
(-3.1127) 
Market sentiments 
CCI 0.3078* 
(7.1324) 
0.2809* 
(7.1762) 
DCRISIS*CCI  0.0079* 
(5.7277) 
VOL -0.0085* 
(-8.1645) 
-0.0080* 
(-8.3530) 
DCRISIS*VOL  -0.0001* 
(-4.3770) 
R2 0.8512 0.8497 
Observations 1694 
Notes: RE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-
statistics, computed using White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square brackets below the 
specification tests are the associated p-values. * indicates significance at 1% level. 
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Table 6. Panel regression: Central countries 
 Without dummy With dummy 
Constant 1.9715* 
(6.8140) 
1.8426* 
(6.1825) 
DCRISIS  -0.1288* 
(-3.8916) 
Macrofundamentals 
INF -1.0207* 
(4.2092) 
-1.0624* 
(3.9951) 
DCRISIS*INF  -0.0303* 
(-3.7634) 
DEB -0.1357* 
(-6.4410) 
-0.1301* 
(-6.4372) 
DCRISIS*DEB  -0.0066* 
(-3.6941) 
CAC 0.2327* 
(3.7058) 
0.2431* 
(4.1258) 
DCRISIS*CAC  0.0012* 
(2.9584) 
Market sentiments 
CCI 0.2201* 
(6.4104) 
0.2139* 
(6.4615) 
DCRISIS*CCI  0.0053* 
(3.7134) 
VOL -0.0068* 
(-6.0229) 
-0.0066* 
(-5.7843) 
DCRISIS*VOL  -0.0003* 
(-4.1013) 
R2  
Within 
Between 
Overall 
 
0.5726 
0.7146 
0.4415 
 
0.7394 
0.7349 
0.7472 
Observations 924 
Notes: FE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, 
computed using Arellano’s (1987) White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted to account for the 
possible correlation within a cluster. In the square brackets below the specification tests are the associated p-values. * 
indicates significance at 1% level. 
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Table 7. Panel regression: Peripheral countries. 
 Without dummy With dummy 
Constant 11.4278* 
(12.0155) 
10.2377* 
(10.3152) 
DCRISIS  -0.5198* 
(-13.3843) 
Macrofundamentals 
DEF -0.4408* 
(-3.8791) 
-0.4130* 
(-3.7687) 
DCRISIS*DEF  -0.0105* 
(-3.7596) 
Market sentiments 
CCI 0.7817* 
(12.3218) 
0.8152* 
(11.1011) 
DCRISIS*CCI  0.0130* 
(10.9831) 
VOL -0.0004* 
(-8.2425) 
-0.0005* 
(-7.1149) 
DCRISIS*VOL  -0.0002* 
(-3.8954) 
R2 0.8572 0.8674 
Observations 780 
Notes: RE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-
statistics, computed using White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square brackets below the 
specification tests are the associated p-values. * indicates significance at 1% level. 
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Figure 1: Daily 10-year sovereign yields in EMU countries and rolling total connectedness: 
      
Figure 2: Rolling total connectedness throughout the period (1/13/2000-1/27/2014) 
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Figure 3: Rolling total connectedness after the breakpoint (6/4/2009-1/27/2014) 
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Figure 4a: Net directional connectedness-EMU Central countries 
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Figure 4b: Net directional connectedness- EMU Peripheral countries 
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Figure 5a: Net pair-wise directional connectedness before and after breakpoint 
 
1/13/2000 to 4/5/2009 (before breakpoint) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4/6/2009 to 1/27/2014 (after breakpoint) 
 
 
 
Notes: We show the most important directional connections among the 55 pairs of the 10-year bond yields under study. Black, red and orange links (black, grey and light grey when viewed in 
greyscale) correspond to the tenth, twentieth and thirtieth percentiles of all net pair-wise directional connections. Node size indicates sovereign debt market size. GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, 
BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland respectively.  
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Figure 5b: Net pair-wise directional connectedness during the five sub-periods after breakpoint 
Sub-period (a): 4/6/2009 to 4/22/2010 
 
Sub-period (b): 4/23/2010 to 7/31/2011 
 
Sub-period (c): 8/1/2011 to 6/30/2012 
 
 
                       Sub-period (d): 7/1/2012 to 3/15/2013 
                       
 
                  Sub-period (e): 3/16/2013 to 1/27/2014                                                                                                            
  
 
Notes: We show the most important directional connections among the 55 pairs of the 10-year bond yields under study. Black, red and orange links (black, grey and light grey when viewed in 
greyscale) correspond to the tenth, twentieth and thirtieth percentiles of all net pair-wise directional connections. Node size indicates sovereign debt market size. GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, 
BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland respectively.  
